21996A0520(01)
Agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
between the European Atomic Energy Community and the United States
of America - Agreed Minute - Declaration on non-proliferation policy
Dates:
OF DOCUMENT: 29/03/1996
OF EFFECT: 12/04/1996; ENTRY INTO FORCE SEE ART 14
OF SIGNATURE: 29/03/1996; BRUSSELS
OF END OF VALIDITY: 11/04/2026; SEE ART 14
Authentic language: THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGES ; SPANISH ; DANISH ;
GERMAN ; GREEK ; ENGLISH ; FRENCH ; ITALIAN ; DUTCH ; PORTUGUESE ;
FINNISH ; SWEDISH
Author:
EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY ; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Subject matter: EXTERNAL RELATIONS ; NUCLEAR COMMON MARKET
Directory code: 11404000 ; 12405000
EUROVOC descriptor: EC cooperation agreement ; United States ;
peaceful use of energy ; nuclear energy ; nuclear non-proliferation
; trading operation
Instruments cited:
258A1108(01)..............
260A0611(01)..............
AGREEMENT for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
between the European Atomic Energy Community and the United States
of America (96/314/Euratom)
THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY,
hereinafter referred to as 'the Community`,
and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
hereinafter referred to as 'the United States of America`,
PREAMBLE
WHEREAS the Community and the United States of America concluded an
Agreement which entered into force on 27 August 1958 and an
Additional Agreement for Cooperation which entered into force on 25
July 1960, as subsequently amended;
WHEREAS the Community and the United States of America recognize the
value of their past cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy and wish to provide for renewed cooperation on the basis of
equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity and without prejudice to the
respective powers of each Party;
WHEREAS the Community and the United States of America are convinced
that by strengthening and expanding their partnership on an equal
footing they will contribute to continued international stability as
well as to political and economic progress;
WHEREAS the Community, its Member States and the United States of
America have attained a comparable advanced level in the use of
nuclear energy for electricity production, in the development of
their nuclear industries and in the security afforded by their
respective laws and regulations concerning health, safety, the
peaceful use of nuclear energy and the protection of the
environment;
WHEREAS it is necessary to establish the conditions governing
transfers of nuclear items between the Community and the United
States of America, to ensure continued compliance with the
requirement for free movement of such items within the Community and
to avoid interference in nuclear programmes in place in the
Community and the United States of America as well as in their
international trading relations;
WHEREAS all Member States of the Community and the United States of
America are Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, hereinafter referred to as 'the Non-Proliferation
Treaty`;
WHEREAS the Community, its Member States and the United States of
America are committed to ensuring that the research, development and
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are carried out in a
manner consistent with the objectives of that Treaty;
WHEREAS nuclear safeguards are applied in the Community pursuant to
the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community;
WHEREAS the Community, its Member States and the United States of
America reaffirm their support of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, hereinafter referred to as 'the IAEA`, and of its safeguards
system;
WHEREAS the Community, its Member States and the United States of
America are strongly committed to strengthening the international
nuclear non-proliferation and related safeguards regimes;
WHEREAS the Community, its Member States and the United States of
America are strongly committed to adequate physical protection of
nuclear material and are Parties to the International Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;
WHEREAS it is desirable to facilitate, as appropriate, trade,
exchanges and cooperation activities at an industrial and commercial
scale, including peaceful international cooperation with third
Parties, in accordance with Article IV of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty;
WHEREAS it is also desirable to set up a framework for exchanges of
information and for consultations between the Parties on nuclear
matters of common interest;
WHEREAS cooperation should extend to nuclear research and
development on nuclear safety and to regulatory and operational
aspects of radiological protection;
WHEREAS cooperation relating to nuclear fission research and
development in such fields as safety, radiological protection,
health and the environment, and safeguards may be subject to
specific agreements between the Community and the United States of
America;
WHEREAS the Community and the United States of America contribute to
international cooperation in the field of controlled thermonuclear
fusion and, in particular, to the activities of the international
thermonuclear experimental reactor (ITER);
WHEREAS it is appropriate that the nuclear cooperation Agreements
concluded between, on the one hand, the United States of America
and, on the other hand, the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of
Spain, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Sweden and the
Republic of Finland before their accession to the European Community
be terminated upon the entry into force of the present Agreement;
WHEREAS likewise the United States of America is prepared to
terminate any nuclear cooperation agreement it may have with third
States acceding to the Community,
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Article 1
Scope of cooperation
1. The Parties may cooperate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
in the following areas:
(A) Nuclear fission research and development on such terms as may be
agreed between the Parties;
(B) Nuclear safety matters of mutual interest and competence, as set
out in Article 2;
(C) Facilitation of exchange and cooperation activities at an
industrial or commercial scale between persons and undertakings;
(D) Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, supply between the
Parties of non-nuclear material, nuclear material and equipment and
provision of nuclear fuel cycle services, whether for use by or for
the benefit of the Parties or third countries;
(E) Exchange of information on major international questions related
to nuclear energy, such as promotion of development in the field of
international nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation within areas
of mutual interest and competence, including collaboration with the
IAEA on safeguards matters and on the interaction between nuclear
energy and the environment;
(F) Controlled thermonuclear fusion including multilateral projects;
(G) Other areas of mutual interest.
2. The cooperation referred to in this Article, as between the
Parties, may also take place between persons and undertakings
established in the respective territories of the Parties.
Article 2
Cooperation on nuclear research and development
1. The Parties may cooperate in nuclear research and development
including the following activities, in so far as they are covered by
the respective nuclear research and development programmes of the
Parties:
(a) nuclear safety, including regulatory and operational aspects of
radiological protection;
(b) development of nuclear energy including, inter alia, research
into new reactors, decommissioning of nuclear installations,
radiological safety research into waste management and disposal and
interaction between nuclear energy and the environment;
(c) nuclear safeguards;
(d) research on controlled thermonuclear fusion including, inter
alia, bilateral activities and contributions towards multilateral
projects such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental
Reactor (ITER).
2. Cooperation pursuant to this Article may include, but is not
limited to, training, exchange of personnel, meetings, exchanges of
samples, materials and instruments for experimental purposes and a
balanced participation in joint studies and projects.
3. Information arising from the implementation of this Article
which, in the judgment of the appropriate authorities of the
Parties, should be placed in the public domain may be so
disseminated by them in a consolidated or other appropriate form,
subject to the Guidelines set out in Annex B.
Article 3
Industrial and commercial cooperation
In conformity with the provisions of Article IV of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Parties undertake to facilitate the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
To this end, the Parties will facilitate, as appropriate, commercial
relations between persons and undertakings involving nuclear
cooperation.
Such cooperation may include, but is not limited to:
- investments,
- joint ventures,
- environmental aspects at industrial or commercial scale,
- trade in nuclear items, non-nuclear material and technical and
specialized services as specified in Article 4,
- licensing arrangements between persons and undertakings in the
territory of either Party.
Article 4
Nuclear trade
1. The Parties shall facilitate nuclear trade between themselves, in
the mutual interests of industry, utilities and consumers and also,
where appropriate, trade between third countries and either Party of
items obligated to the other Party.
2. Authorizations, including export and import licences as well as
authorizations or consents to third parties, relating to trade,
industrial operations or nuclear material movements on the
territories of the Parties shall not be used to restrict trade. The
relevant authority shall act upon applications for such
authorizations as soon as possible after submission and without
unreasonable expense. Appropriate administrative procedures shall be
in place to ensure respect of this provision.
Article 5
Items subject to the Agreement
1. Non-nuclear material, nuclear material and equipment transferred
between the Parties or their respective persons or undertakings,
whether directly or through a third country, shall become subject to
this Agreement upon their entry into the territorial jurisdiction of
the receiving Party, provided that the supplying Party has notified
the receiving Party in writing of the intended transfer and the
receiving Party has acknowledged in writing the receipt of this
notification.
2. Non-nuclear material, nuclear material and equipment referred to
in this Article shall remain subject to the provisions of this
Agreement until it has been determined, in accordance with the
procedures set out in the Administrative Arrangement:
- that such items have been re-transferred beyond the jurisdiction
of the receiving Party;
- that nuclear material or non-nuclear material are no longer usable
for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of
international safeguards or have become practically irrecoverable;
- or that equipment is no longer usable for nuclear purposes.
Article 6
Safeguards
1. Safeguards required under this Agreement shall be those applied
by the Community pursuant to the Euratom Treaty and by the IAEA
pursuant to the following safeguards agreements, as relevant, as
they may be revised and replaced so long as coverage as required by
the Non-Proliferation Treaty is provided for:
(a) the Agreement between the Community, its non-nuclear weapon
Member States and the IAEA, which entered into force on 21 February
1977;
(b) the Agreement between the Community, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the IAEA, which entered into force
on 14 August 1978;
(c) the Agreement between the Community, France and the IAEA, which
entered into force on 12 September 1981;
(d) the Agreement between the United States of America and the IAEA,
which entered into force on 9 December 1980.
2. (A) Nuclear material transferred to the Community pursuant to
this Agreement, and special fissionable material used in or produced
through the use of any non-nuclear material, nuclear material or
equipment, so transferred, shall be subject to the relevant
agreements referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.
(B) Nuclear material transferred to the United States of America
pursuant to this Agreement, and special fissionable material used in
or produced through the use of any non-nuclear material, nuclear
material or equipment, so transferred, shall be subject to the
Agreement referred to in paragraph 1 (d) of this.
3. In the event that any of the IAEA safeguards agreements referred
to in paragraph 1 (a), (b) or (c) are not being applied,
(a) the Community shall enter into an agreement or agreements with
the IAEA for the application of safeguards which provide for
effectiveness and coverage equivalent to that provided by the
safeguards agreements required by paragraphs 1 (a), (b) and (c) or,
if that is not possible,
(b) the Community shall give the United States of America an
assurance that safeguards are being applied by the Community which
provide for effectiveness and coverage equivalent to that provided
by the safeguards agreements required by paragraph 1 (a), (b) and
(c). In the fulfilment of obligations arising from these paragraphs,
the United States of America hereby recognizes the unique role and
importance of the Euratom safeguards system and of its application
in the Community pursuant to the Euratom Treaty. In this context,
the United States of America further takes note that the IAEA,
pursuant to the safeguards agreements concluded with the Community
and its Member States as well as in subsequent implementing
arrangements, shall take due account, inter alia, of the
effectiveness of the Community's system of safeguards enabling the
IAEA to deploy an inspection effort less than that applied under
other safeguards agreements in which there are comparable nuclear
facilities producing, processing, using or storing safeguarded
nuclear material where a regional safeguards system does not exist.
(c) In the event that conditions arise which do not permit
application of such safeguards by the Community, the Parties shall
immediately establish safeguards arrangements for the application of
safeguards which provide for effectiveness and coverage equivalent
to that provided by the safeguards agreements required by paragraphs
1 (a), (b) and (c) of this Article.
4. In the event that the IAEA safeguards Agreement referred to in
paragraph 1 (d) of this Article, is not being applied,
(a) the United States of America shall enter into an agreement or
agreements with the IAEA for the application of safeguards which
provide for effectiveness and coverage equivalent to that provided
by the safeguards agreement required by paragraph 1 (d) of this
Article or, if that is not possible,
(b) the Parties shall immediately establish safeguards arrangements
for the application of safeguards which provide for effectiveness
and coverage equivalent to that provided by the safeguards Agreement
required by paragraph 1 (d) of this Article.
Article 7
Peaceful use
2. Non-nuclear material, nuclear material and equipment transferred
pursuant to this Agreement and special fissionable material used in
or produced through the use of such items shall not be used for any
nuclear explosive device, for research on or development of any
nuclear explosive device or for any military purpose.
Article 8
Nuclear fuel cycle activities
1. The nuclear fuel cycle activities carried out pursuant to this
Agreement include:
(A) Within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party, enrichment
up to 20 % in the isotope 235, of uranium transferred pursuant to
this Agreement, as well as of uranium used in or produced through
the use of equipment so transferred. Enrichment of such uranium to
more than 20 % in the isotope 235 and re-enrichment of such uranium
already enriched to more than 20 % in the isotope 235 may be carried
out according to conditions agreed upon in writing which shall be
the subject of consultations between the Parties within 40 days of
the receipt of a request from either Party.
(B) Irradiation within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party
of plutonium, uranium-233, high enriched uranium and irradiated
nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in
or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear
material or equipment so transferred.
(C) Retransfer to third countries according to procedures set out in
the Agreed Minute of:
(i) low enriched uranium, non-nuclear material, equipment and source
material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or of low enriched
uranium produced through the use of nuclear material or equipment
transferred pursuant to this Agreement, for nuclear fuel cycle
activities other than the production of HEU;
(ii) irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this
Agreement or irradiated nuclear material used in or produced through
the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment
transferred pursuant to this Agreement, for storage or disposal not
involving reprocessing;
(iii) other nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement
and other special fissionable material produced through the use of
non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment transferred
pursuant to this Agreement, for other fuel cycle activities
including those specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article.
(D) Post-irradiation examination involving chemical dissolution or
separation of irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to
this Agreement or irradiated nuclear material used in or produced
through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or
equipment so transferred;
(E) Conditioning, storage and final disposal of irradiated materials
transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced
through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material and
equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement.
2. The following nuclear fuel cycle activities may be carried out
pursuant to this Agreement within the territorial jurisdiction of
either Party in facilities forming part of the delineated peaceful
nuclear programme described in Annex A:
(A) Reprocessing of nuclear material transferred pursuant to this
Agreement and nuclear material used in or produced through the use
of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so
transferred;
(B) Alteration in form or content of plutonium, uranium 233 and high
enriched uranium transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in
or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear
material or equipment so transferred.
3. The following nuclear materials:
(i) plutonium, uranium-233 and high enriched uranium, if not
contained in irradiated nuclear fuel, transferred pursuant to this
Agreement;
(ii) plutonium, uranium-233 and high enriched uranium recovered from
nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement;
(iii) plutonium, uranium-233 and high enriched uranium recovered
from nuclear material used in equipment transferred pursuant to this
Agreement
may be stored in facilities that are at all times subject, as a
minimum, to the levels of physical protection that are set out in
Annex C to IAEA document INFCIRC 254/REV 1/Part 1 (Guidelines for
nuclear transfers) as it may be revised and accepted by the Parties
and the Member States of the Community.
Each Party shall record its facilities on a list, made available to
the other Party. A Party's list shall be held confidential if that
Party so requests. Either Party may make changes to its list by
notifying the other Party in writing and receiving a written
acknowledgement. Such acknowledgement shall be given no later than
30 days after the receipt of the notification and shall be limited
to a statement that the notification has been received.
If there are grounds to believe that the provisions of this
sub-Article are not being fully complied with, immediate
consultations may be called for.
Following upon such consultations, each Party shall ensure by means
of such consultations that necessary corrective measures are taken
immediately. Such measures shall be sufficient to restore the levels
of physical protection referred to above at the facility in
question. If this proves not to be feasible, the nuclear material in
question shall be transferred for storage at another appropriate,
listed facility.
Article 9
International obligations exchanges
The Parties shall establish expeditious procedures to be applied
when nuclear material is to be made subject to this Agreement or
removed from the coverage of this Agreement. These procedures shall
include provisions on international exchanges of obligations, which
will be set out in the Administrative Arrangement, provided for in
paragraph 1 of Article 16.
Article 10
Implementation of the Agreement
1. The terms of this Agreement shall be implemented in good faith
and with due regard to the legitimate commercial interests, whether
international or domestic, of either Party.
2. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed:
(a) to avoid hampering or delaying the nuclear activities in the
territory of either Party;
(b) to avoid interference in such activities;
(c) to be consistent with prudent management practices required for
the economic and safe conduct of such activities;
(d) to take full account of the long-term requirements of the
nuclear energy programmes in place in the Community and in the
United States of America.
3. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be used for the
purpose of:
(a) securing unfair commercial or industrial advantages, or of
restricting trade to the disadvantage of persons and undertakings of
either Party or hampering their commercial or industrial interests,
whether international or domestic;
(b) interfering with the nuclear policy or programmes of either
Party nor for hindering the promotion of the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy;
(c) impeding the free movement of nuclear material, non-nuclear
material and equipment within the territory of the Community.
4. In exercising the rights arising from other nuclear cooperation
agreements it might have concluded with third parties, each Party to
this Agreement will pay due regard to the legitimate commercial
interests of the other Party; in case of difficulty either Party may
call for consultations which shall take place within 40 days, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 12.
Article 11
Physical protection
1. Nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and
special fissionable material used in or produced through the use of
non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred
shall be subject to adequate measures of physical protection.
2. Such physical protection measures shall be at levels which shall
satisfy the criteria set out in Annex C to IAEA document INFCIRC
254/REV 1/Part 1 (Guidelines for nuclear transfers) as it may be
revised and accepted by the Parties and the Member States of the
Community. As a supplement to this document, the Member States of
the Community, the Commission of the European Communities (as
appropriate), and the United States of America will refer, when
applying these measures, to the recommendations of IAEA document
INFCIRC 225/REV 3 on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as
it may be revised and accepted by the Parties and the Member States
of the Community.
3. International transport of nuclear material subject to this
Agreement shall be subject to the provisions of the International
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC
274/REV 1), as it may be revised and accepted by the Parties and the
Member States of the Community.
Article 12
Consultation and arbitration
1. The Parties shall consult at the request of either of them to
promote cooperation under this Agreement and to ensure its effective
implementation. A Joint Committee shall be established for these
purposes. This Committee will also consult on nuclear questions of
mutual interest and any other significant matters relating to the
cooperation envisaged by this Agreement. A Joint Technical Working
Group reporting to the Joint Committee will be set up to ensure the
fulfilment of the requirements of the Administrative Arrangement
referred to in Article 16.
2. The Parties shall consult, at the request of either of them, on
any question arising out of the interpretation or application of
this Agreement.
3. Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of
this Agreement shall be settled by negotiation, mediation,
conciliation or other similar procedure or, if both Parties agree,
by submission to an arbitral tribunal which shall be composed of
three arbitrators appointed in accordance with the provisions of
this paragraph. Each Party shall designate one arbitrator and the
two arbitrators so designated shall elect a third, a national of a
country other than the United States of America or a Member State of
the Community, who shall be the Chairman. If, within 30 days of the
request for arbitration, a Party has not designated an arbitrator,
the other Party may request the President of the International Court
of Justice to appoint an arbitrator. The same procedure shall apply
if, within 30 days of the designation or appointment of the second
arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not been elected, provided that
the third arbitrator so appointed shall not be a national of the
United States of America or of a Member State of the Community. All
decisions shall require the concurrence of two arbitrators. The
arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of
the tribunal shall be binding on the Parties.
Article 13
Suspension and termination
A. Circumstances
1. If either Party or a Member State of the Community at any time
following the entry into force of this Agreement:
(a) materially acts in violation of the fundamental provisions of
Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 or 11 of the Agreement or contravenes a
decision of the arbitral tribunal referred to in Article 12 of this
Agreement, or
(b) takes action of any kind which results in a material violation
of its obligations under this Agreement, including prevention of
nuclear trade envisaged under this Agreement,
the other Party shall have the right to cease further cooperation
under this Agreement or to suspend or terminate, in whole or in
part, this Agreement. Furthermore, if a Party suspends its consent
to the activities, referred to in Article 8.2, for reasons other
than those set out in paragraph 8(A) of the Agreed Minute, including
situations which are not of the same or greater degree of
seriousness as those set out in paragraph 8(A) under (a) or (b) of
the Agreed Minute, the other Party shall have the same right.
2. If either Party or a Member State of the Community at any time
following entry into force of this Agreement terminates or abrogates
a safeguards agreement with the Agency and the safeguards agreement
so terminated or abrogated has not been replaced by an equivalent
safeguards agreement when appropriate and relevant, the other Party
shall have the right to require the return in whole on in part of
non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment transferred
pursuant to this Agreement and special fissionable material produced
through the use of such items.
3. If the Community or a non-nuclear weapon Member State of the
Community detonates a nuclear explosive device, the Government of
the United States of America shall have the right specified in
paragraph 2 of this Article.
4. If a nuclear-weapon Member State of the Community detonates a
nuclear explosive device using any item subject to this Agreement,
the United States of America shall have the right specified in
paragraph 2 of this Article.
5. If the United States of America detonates a nuclear explosive
device using any item subject to this Agreement, the Community shall
have the right specified in paragraph 2 of this Article.
B. Implementation
6. Before either Party decides to take action pursuant to paragraphs
1 to 5 above, the Parties shall hold consultations for the purpose
of taking corrective measures and shall carefully consider the
effects of such action, taking into account the need to make such
other appropriate arrangements as may be required and, in
particular, to ensure security and continuity of supply and adequate
time for replacement and further to honour commitments to third
countries and their industrial entities.
7. Before taking action under this Article, the Parties shall
consider whether the facts triggering such steps were caused
deliberately.
8. Action under this Article shall only be taken if the other Party
fails to take corrective measures within an appropriate period of
time following consultations.
9. If either Party exercises its right, pursuant to paragraphs 2 to
5 of this Article, to require the return of any items, it shall,
prior to the removal form the territory or from the control of the
other Party, compensate promptly that Party for the fair market
value thereof and for the costs incurred as a consequence of such
removal. If the return of nuclear items is to be required, the
Parties shall determine jointly the relevant quantity of nuclear
items, taking account of the circumstances involved. The Parties
shall further satisfy themselves that full safety, radiological and
physical protection measures, in accordance with their existing
obligations, are taken in relation to the return of the items, that
no unreasonable risks are incurred and that the return of items
takes place in a manner consistent with all the relevant laws and
regulations of the Parties.
Article 14
Duration and amendment
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the
Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that their
respective internal procedures necessary for its entry into force
have been completed.
2. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of thirty years
and shall continue in force thereafter for additional periods of
five years each. Either Party may, by giving six months' written
notice to the other Party, terminate this Agreement at the end of
the initial thirty-year period or at the end of any subsequent
five-year period.
3. Notwithstanding the termination or suspension of this Agreement,
the rights and obligations pursuant to Articles 6, 7, 8.1 (C) and 11
and to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the Agreed
Minute shall continue in effect.
4. If a Party gives to the other Party the written notice provided
for in paragraph 2, or if a Party suspends or terminates this
Agreement pursuant to Article 13.1, the Parties shall hold
consultations as soon as possible but not later than one month
afterwards, for the purpose of deciding jointly whether, in addition
to those referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, further rights
and obligations arising out of this Agreement, and in particular out
of Article 8.1 (A), 8.1 (B), 8.1 (D), 8.2 and 8.3 and the Agreed
Minute relating thereto, shall continue in effect.
5. If the Parties are unable to reach a joint decision pursuant to
paragraph 4,
(a) quantities of nuclear material equivalent to the inventory
described in Article 20.1, and items of equipment described in
Article 20.2, shall continue to be subject to the provisions of
Articles 8.1 (A), 8.1 (B), 8.1 (D), 8.2, 8.3 and Article 13 and
their Agreed Minute but only to the extent covered by the Agreements
referred to in Article 19.
(b) The question whether further rights and obligations, in addition
to those referred to in paragraph 3 and subparagraph (a) of this
paragraph of this Article, shall continue in effect in relation to
nuclear material and equipment not covered by subparagraph (a), and
to all non-nuclear material, shall be submitted to an arbitral
tribunal composed pursuant to Article 12.3. The tribunal shall make
its decision on the basis of the application of the rules and
principles of international law, and in particular the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.
(c) If the arbitral tribunal decides that rights and obligations
other than those referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article shall
not continue in effect with respect to non-nuclear material, nuclear
material and equipment subject to arbitration pursuant to
subparagraph (b), either Party shall have the right to require,
subject to the procedures provided for in Article 13.9, the return
of such non-nuclear material, nuclear material and equipment in the
territory of the other Party on the day of termination of this
Agreement.
(d) Until the Parties reach a joint decision or the arbitral
tribunal renders its decision, this Agreement will remain in force
notwithstanding the written notice pursuant to paragraph 2.
6. The Parties may consult, at the request of either, on possible
amendments to this Agreement, particularly to take account of
international developments in the field of nuclear safeguards. This
Agreement may be amended if the Parties so agree. Any amendment
shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange
diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective internal
procedures necessary for its entry into force have been completed.
Article 15
Multiple obligations
1. The Parties shall endeavour to avoid any difficulties arising out
of the overlapping of obligations on nuclear material as a result of
the application of several agreements concerning international
trade.
2. The Parties shall promote multilateral consultations with a view
to achieving mutually satisfactory solutions at international level.
Article 16
Administrative Arrangement
1. The appropriate authorities of the Parties shall establish an
Administrative Arrangement in order to provide for the effective
implementation of the provisions of this Agreement.
2. The principles of fungibility, equivalence and proportionality
shall apply to nuclear material subject to the Agreement and the
detailed provisions thereof will be set out in the Administrative
Arrangement.
3. An Administrative Arrangement established pursuant to this
Article may be amended by written agreement between the appropriate
authorities of the Parties.
Article 17
Intellectual property
1. The Parties shall apply international rules they have both
formally accepted governing the treatment of intellectual property
and technology transfers to intellectual property created or
transferred and technology transferred pursuant to this Agreement.
2. Annex B shall apply to intellectual property created or
transferred and technology transferred pursuant to this Agreement.
3. The Parties shall ensure that individual agreements they enter
into pursuant to Annex B are consistent with this Agreement and with
any additional rules concerning treatment of sensitive or
confidential information in the nuclear field that may be agreed by
the Parties.
Article 18
Status of Annexes
The Annexes from an integral part of this Agreement and, unless
expressly provided otherwise, a reference to this Agreement includes
its Annexes.
Article 19
Termination of existing Agreements
1. The Agreements between the European Atomic Energy Community and
the Government of the United States of America that entered into
force on 27 August 1958 shall be terminated upon the entry into
force of this Agreement. The Additional Agreement for Cooperation
between the United States of America and the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom) that entered into force on 25 July 1960, as
subsequently amended, shall expire as provided for in Article VI of
that Agreement or shall be terminated upon entry into force of this
Agreement, whichever is the earlier.
2. The bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements that the United
States of America has concluded with the Republic of Austria, on 11
July 1969, the Kingdom of Spain, on 20 March 1974, the Portuguese
Republic, on 16 May 1974, the Kingdom of Sweden, on 19 December
1983, and the Republic of Finland, on 2 May 1985, shall be
terminated upon the entry into force of this Agreement. The rights
and obligations with respect to nuclear supply arising out of such
agreements shall be replaced by those of this Agreement.
3. The rights and obligations with respect to nuclear supply arising
out of a nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States of
America and any third State that accedes to the Community after the
entry into force of this Agreement shall be replaced by those of
this Agreement upon accession by that State to the Community. The
rights and obligations with respect to other areas of nuclear
cooperation shall be the subject of negotiations between the
Community, the United States of America and the third State
concerned, in accordance with the provisions of Article 106 of the
Euratom Treaty.
Article 20
Initial inventories
1. The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the inventory of
nuclear material formerly subject to the agreements referred to in
Article 19 from the date upon which such agreements terminate.
2. The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to equipment and
non-nuclear material transferred pursuant to the agreements referred
to in Article 19 only to the extent covered by those agreements.
3. The inventories of nuclear material, equipment and non-nuclear
material subject to the agreements referred to in Article 19 shall
be approved by the appropriate authorities of the Parties.
Article 21
Definitions
For the purposes of this Agreement:
1. 'Parties` means the Government of the United States of America
and the European Atomic Energy Community.
2. (a) 'Community` means both:
(i) the legal person created by the Treaty establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), Party to this Agreement;
(ii) the territories to which the Euratom Treaty applies;
(b) 'within the Community` means within the territories to which the
Euratom Treaty applies;
(c) 'beyond the Community` has the corresponding meaning.
3. 'Appropriate authority` means, in the case of the United States
of America, the Department of State; in the case of the Community,
the European Commission, or such other authority as the Party
concerned may at any time notify to the other Party.
4. 'Equipment` means any reactor as a complete unit, other than one
designed or used primarily for the formation of plutonium or
uranium-233 or any other item so designated jointly by the
appropriate authorities of the Parties.
5. 'Non-nuclear material` means heavy water, or any other material
suitable for use in a reactor to slow down high velocity neutrons
and increase the likelihood of further fission, as may be jointly
designated by the appropriate authorities of the Parties.
6. 'Nuclear material` means (1) source material and (2) special
fissionable material. 'Source material` means uranium containing the
mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the
isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal,
alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material
containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the
Board of Governors of the IAEA shall from time to time determine;
and such other materials as the Board of Governors of the Agency may
determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both
Parties. 'Special fissionable material` means plutonium,
uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or 235, any
substance containing one or more of the foregoing, and such other
substances as the Board of Governors of the Agency may determine or
as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both Parties.
'Special fissionable material` does not include 'source material`.
Any determination by the Board of Governors of the Agency under
Article XX of that Agency's Statute or otherwise that amends the
list of material considered to be 'source material` or 'special
fissionable material` shall only have effect under this Agreement
when both Parties to this Agreement have informed each other in
writing that they accept such amendment.
7. 'High enriched uranium` means uranium enriched to more than 20 %
in the isotope 235 (and/or uranium 233); 'low enriched uranium`
means uranium enriched to 20 % or less in the isotope 235 (and/or
uranium 233);
8. The following definitions relate to Article 17 and Annex B:
- 'Cooperative activity` means any joint activity carried on under
this Agreement, and includes joint research;
- 'Information` means scientific or technical data, results or
methods of research and development stemming from the joint research
and any other information deemed necessary to be provided or
exchanged under this Agreement or research pursuant thereto;
- 'Joint research` means research undertaken jointly by the Parties
directly or on their behalf by a person, legal entity, research
institute or other designated by a Party or research undertaken
jointly by participants;
- 'Participant` means a person, legal entity, research institute or
other body participating in joint research but not on behalf of one
of the Parties.
9. 'Persons and undertakings` means any natural person who, and any
undertaking or institution, whatever its public or private legal
status, which pursues all or any of its activities within the
Community or in the territory of the United States of America within
the scope of this Agreement.
10. 'Alteration in form or content` means conversion of plutonium,
high enriched uranium of uranium-233 or fabrication of fuel
containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium 233; it does
not include post irradiation examination involving chemical
dissolution or separation, disassembly or reassembly of fuel
assemblies, irradiation, reprocessing or enrichment.
11. 'Storage facility` means any facility (or any part of a facility
so designated by inclusion in one of the lists referred to in
Article 8.3) the primary purpose and function of which is the
separate storage of sensitive nuclear material as described in
paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) of Article 8.3 under adequate
conditions of control, safety and safeguards as well as of physical
protection as described in Article 11.2.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by
the European Atomic Energy Community and the Government of the
United States of America respectively, have signed this Agreement.
AGREED MINUTE
During the negotiation of the Agreement for Cooperation in the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the United States of America
and the Community signed today, the following understandings, which
shall be an integral part of the Agreement, were reached.
A. Peaceful purposes
1. The Parties agree that, with reference to Article 7, 'peaceful
purposes` includes provision of power for a military base drawn from
any power network or production of radioisotopes to be used for
medical purposes in a military hospital.
B. Nuclear fuel cycle activities
2. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, the Parties shall
exchange lists of third countries to which re-transfers pursuant to
Article 8.1(C)(i) may be made by the other Party. Eligibility for
continued inclusion on such lists shall be based, as a minimum, upon
satisfaction of the following criteria:
- third countries must have made effective non-proliferation
commitments, normally by being party to, and in full respect of
their obligations under the Non-proliferation Treaty or the Treaty
of Tlatelolco and by being in compliance with the conditions of
INFCIRC 254/REV 1/Part 1;
- in case of re-transfer of items obligated to the United States
from the territory of the Member States of the Community, third
countries must be party to a nuclear cooperation agreement with the
United States.
3. Should re-transfers pursuant to Article 8.1(C)(ii) and (iii) be
requested in the future by a Party, a list of third countries to
which such re-transfers may be made, shall be provided by the other
Party. In this connection, the Parties shall take into account the
following additional criteria:
- consistency of the proposed action with the guidelines contained
in IAEA document INFCIRC 225/REV 3 and with the provisions of IAEA
document INFCIRC 274/REV 1, as they may be revised and accepted by
the Parties and the Member States;
- the nature and content of the peaceful nuclear programmes of the
third country in question;
- the potential proliferation and security implications of the
transfer for either Party or a Member State of the Community.
4. Either Party may add eligible third countries to its lists at any
time. Either Party may delete third countries from its lists
following consultations with the other Party. Neither Party shall
delete third countries from its lists for the purpose of obtaining
commercial advantage or of delaying, hampering or hindering the
peaceful nuclear programmes of the other Party or its peaceful
nuclear cooperation with third countries. The Parties will cooperate
in efforts to obtain as soon as possible on a generic basis a
confirmation from the third countries on the lists that any
re-transferred items will be subject to any agreement for
cooperation in force between the receiving country and the
non-re-transferring Party. The receipt of such confirmation shall
not constitute a precondition for the addition of a third country to
the lists.
Re-transfers to third countries not included on the lists may be
considered on a case-by-case basis.
5. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions of
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, the provisions set out in the Exchange of
Notes dated 18 July 1988 between the Commission of the European
Communities and the United States Mission to the European
Communities concerning the Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy between the United States of America and
Japan shall remain in effect as long as this Agreement remains in
force. The Parties confirm that the abovementioned provisions shall
apply, inter alia, to plutonium contained in mixed oxide fuel. The
consents granted therein may be suspended only if an event of the
same or greater degree of seriousness as those referred to in
paragraph 8 arises which directly threatens either the re-transfer
or the activities involving the re-transferred plutonium in Japan.
6. With reference to paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement and
notwithstanding paragraph 6 of Article 14, either Party, acting
through its appropriate authorities, may make changes to the
peaceful nuclear programmes it has delineated by notifying the other
Party in writing in accordance with the procedures set forth below
and receiving a written acknowledgement.
7. Such acknowledgement shall be given no later than 30 days after
the receipt of the notification and shall be limited to a statement
that the notification has been received. Intended changes in
delineated programmes shall receive the fullest possible
consideration during consultations under the Agreement, which may
include an exchange of information and views on safeguards matters
of mutual interest.
(A) For an addition of a facility within its territorial
jurisdiction to the peaceful nuclear programme delineated by the
Community, the notification shall contain:
(i) the name, type and location of the facility and its existing or
planned capacity;
(ii) a confirmation that the Euratom Safeguards Regulation 3227/76,
as amended, is fully applied;
(iii) for a facility to be under IAEA safeguards inspections
pursuant to a safeguards agreement referred to in paragraph 1(a),
(b) or (c) of Article 6, a confirmation that relevant safeguards
arrangements have been agreed upon with the IAEA and that those
arrangements will permit the IAEA to exercise fully its rights
pursuant to the aforementioned safeguards agreements, in the light
of how these agreements are implemented during the life of this
Agreement and so as to enable the IAEA to meet its objectives and
inspection goal;
(iv) such non-confidential information as is available to the
Community on the IAEA safeguards approach and non-confidential
information on Euratom safeguards relevant to the facility;
(v) a confirmation that physical protection measures as required by
Article 11 of this Agreement will be applied.
(B) For an addition of a facility within its territorial
jurisdiction to the delineated peaceful nuclear programme of the
United States, the notification shall contain:
(i) the name, type and location of the facility and its existing or
planned capacity;
(ii) for facilities licensed or certified by the United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, a confirmation that the Fundamental
Nuclear Material Control Plan, describing how the requirements of
the US Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 74, as amended,
will be met, has been approved for the facility; for United States
Department of Energy civil facilities, a confirmation that the
facility is in compliance with the requirements of the Department of
Energy Order 5633.3B, 'Control and Accountability of Nuclear
Materials` and associated guides, as amended;
(iii) for a facility to be under IAEA safeguards inspections
pursuant to the safeguards agreement referred to in paragraph 1(d)
of Article 6, a confirmation that the relevant safeguards
arrangements have been agreed upon with the IAEA and that those
arrangements will permit the IAEA to exercise fully its rights
pursuant to the aforementioned safeguards agreement, in the light of
how this agreement is implemented during the life of this Agreement
and so as to enable the IAEA to meet its objectives and inspection
goal;
(iv) information on the basic features contained in the fundamental
Nuclear Material Control Plan or the compliance with the Department
of Energy Order referred to above, and such non-confidential
information as is available to the United States on the IAEA
safeguards approach; and
(v) a confirmation that physical protection measures as required by
Article 11 of this Agreement will be applied.
(C) Either Party may delete a facility from the peaceful nuclear
programme it has delineated, by providing to the other Party a
notification containing the facility name and other relevant
information available.
8. A. The activities referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this
Agreement may proceed as long as those provisions continue in effect
with respect to the peaceful nuclear programme delineated by a
Party, unless the other Party considers, pursuant to the procedures
set out below, that these activities should be suspended on the
basis of objective evidence that their continuation would entail a
serious threat to the security of either Party or of a Member State
of the Community, or a significant increase in the risk of nuclear
proliferation, resulting from a situation of the same or greater
degree of seriousness as the following:
(a) With regard to the Community:
(i) a non-nuclear-weapon Member State of the Community detonates a
nuclear weapon or any other nuclear explosive device;
(ii) a nuclear-weapon Member State of the Community detonates a
nuclear weapon or any other nuclear explosive device using any item
subject to this Agreement;
(iii) a Member State of the Community or the Community, as relevant,
materially, violates, terminates, or declares itself not to be bound
by, the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the relevant safeguards
agreements referred to in Article 6.1 or the Guidelines applicable
to the transfers of nuclear items laid down in document INFCIRC
254/REV 1/Part 1, as it may be revised and accepted by the Parties;
(iv) a Member State of the Community re-transfers an item subject to
this Agreement to a non-nuclear-weapon State which has not concluded
a full-scope safeguards Agreement with the IAEA;
(v) a Member State of the Community is subjected to measures taken
by the Board of Governors of the IAEA, pursuant to Article 19 of the
relevant safeguards Agreement referred to in Article 6.1(a), (b) or
(c);
(vi) acts of war or serious internal disturbances preventing the
maintenance of law and order, or serious international tension
constituting a threat of war, that threaten severely and directly
the safeguarding or physical protection of such activities.
(b) With regard to the United States:
(i) the United States detonates a nuclear weapon or any other
nuclear explosive device using any item subject to this Agreement;
(ii) the United States materially violates, terminates or declares
itself not to be bound by, the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the
relevant safeguards agreement referred to in Article 6.1.(d) or the
guidelines applicable to the transfers of nuclear items laid down in
document INFCIRC 254/REV 1/Part 1, as it may be revised and accepted
by the Parties;
(iii) the United States retransfers an item subject to this
Agreement to a non-nuclear-weapon State which has not concluded a
full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA;
(iv) the United States is subjected to measures taken by the Board
of Governors of the IAEA, pursuant to Article 18 of the safeguards
Agreement referred in Article 6.1(d);
(v) acts of war or serious internal disturbances preventing the
maintenance of law and order or serious international tension
constituting a threat of war, that threaten severely and directly
the safeguarding or physical protection of such activities.
B. The Party considering that such objective evidence may exist,
shall consult with the other Party, at Cabinet level for the United
States and at European Commission level for the Community, before
reaching any decision.
C. Any such decision that such objective evidence does exist, and
that activities referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 8 should
therefore be suspended, shall be taken only by the President of the
United States or by the Council of the European Union, as the case
may be, and shall be notified in writing to the other Party.
D. Any decision taken by a Party pursuant to this paragraph shall
apply to the activities of the other Party referred to in Article 8,
paragraph 2 of this Agreement, taken as a whole.
E. The Parties confirm that, as of the time of entry into force of
this Agreement, there exists no objective evidence of any of the
threats referred to above and that they do not foresee any such
threats developing in the future.
9. Actions of governments of third countries or events beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of either Party shall not be used as a
basis for invoking the provisions of paragraph 8 with respect to
activities or facility operations within that Party's territorial
jurisdiction unless, due to such actions or events, those activities
or facility operations would clearly result in a significant
increase in the risk of nuclear proliferation or in a serious threat
to the security of the Party invoking the provisions of paragraph 8.
10. The Party invoking the provisions of paragraph 8 shall keep
under constant review the development of the situation which
prompted the decision and shall withdraw its invocation as soon as
warranted.
11. The provisions of paragraph 8 shall not be invoked due to
differences over the nature of the Parties' peaceful nuclear
programmes or fuel cycle choices, or for the purpose of obtaining
commercial advantage, or of delaying, hampering or hindering the
peaceful nuclear programmes or activities of the other Party, or its
peaceful nuclear cooperation with third countries.
12. Any decision to invoke the provisions of paragraph 8 shall only
be taken in the most extreme circumstances of exceptional concern
from a non-proliferation or security point of view and shall be
applied for the minimum period of time necessary to deal in a manner
acceptable to the Parties with the exceptional case.
13. Should the activities agreed upon in paragraph 2 of Article 8 of
the Agreement be suspended, as provided in paragraph 8, quantities
of nuclear material equivalent to the inventory described in Article
14. For the purpose of implementing the provisions of Article 8 and
paragraphs 2-5 of Article 13 with respect to special fissionable
material produced through the use of nuclear material and/or
non-nuclear material transferred pursuant to the Agreement, when
such nuclear material and/or non-nuclear material is used in
equipment not so transferred, such provisions shall be applied to
that proportion of special fissionable material produced that
represents the ratio of transferred nuclear material and/or
non-nuclear material used in the production of the special
fissionable material to the total amount of nuclear material and/or
non-nuclear material so used.
D. Resulting obligations
15. The obligations arising out of Articles 6, 7 and 11 in relation
to special fissionable material produced through the use of nuclear
material subject to the Agreement in equipment not transferred under
the Agreement may be satisfied without specific tracking of that
special fissionable material. When such special fissionable material
is subsequently used in equipment not so transferred, that equipment
shall, during such use, be operated for peaceful applications only.
E. Suspension and termination
16. Both sides regard it as extremely unlikely that actions would be
taken by the Community, its Member States or the United States of
America which would cause the other Party to invoke the rights
specified in Article 13. Nonetheless this Article reflects the firm
conviction of both Parties that they would view with the utmost
concern acts constituting a material violation or breach of
non-proliferation commitments by any country and that appropriate
actions such as those provided for in Article 13 would be taken by
the Community, its Member States or the United States of America in
response to any material violation of non-proliferation commitments.
17. No violation may be considered as being material unless
corresponding to the definition of material violation or breach
contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
18. Additionally, a determination as to whether there has been a
material violation of the fundamental safeguards commitments
contained in the safeguards Agreements referred to in Article 6.1 or
in such other agreement as may amend or replace them, would only be
made by the President of the United States of America or the Council
of the European Union, as relevant. In making such a determination,
a crucial factor will be whether the Board of Governors of the
Agency has made a finding of non-compliance.
Done at Brussels this seventh day of November 1995, in duplicate, in
the English language,
Udfördiget i Bruxelles, den 7. november 1995, i to eksemplarer põ
engelsk,
Gedaan te Brussel op 7 november 1995, in tweevoud, in de Engelse
taal,
Tehty Brysselissō 7 pōivōnō marraskuuta 1995 kahtena samanlaisena
kappaleena englannin kielellō,
Fait š Bruxelles, le 7 novembre 1995, en deux exemplaires, en langue
anglaise,
Geschehen zu BrŽssel am 7. November 1995 in zwei Urschriften in
englischer Sprache,
øółżõ ėĮłĖ ĀęįžąūūõĖ, ėĮłĖ 7 Ķ˙õüņęč˙į 1995, õłĖ ōłĘū˙žż, ėĮń
ńóóūłśĄ,
Fatto a Bruxelles, addü 7 novembre 1995, in duplice copia, in lingua
inglese,
Feito em Bruxelas em sete de Novembro de mil novecentos e noventa e
cinco, em duplo exemplar, em lżngua inglesa,
Hecho en Bruselas, el 7 de noviembre de 1995, en doble ejemplar en
lengua inglesa,
Utfōrdat i Bryssel den 7 november 1995 põ engelska i tvõ likalydande
exemplar,
For the European Atomic Energy Community
For det Europöiske Atomenergiföllesskab
Voor de Europese Gemeenschap voor Atoomenergie
Euroopan atomienergiayhteisŠn puolesta
Pour la Communautł europłenne de l'łnergie atomique
FŽr die Europōische Atomgemeinschaft
Ćłń Į÷ż ÅįęųĘńŪśČ Ź˙łżŽĮ÷Įń ĮĮ˙üłśČĖ ÅżąęóõłńĖ
Per la Comunitš europea dell'energia atomica
Pela Comunidade Europeia da Energia Atėmica
Por la Comunidad Europea de la Energża Atėmica
Põ Europeiska Atomenergigemenskapens vōgnar
>REFERENCE TO A FILM>
Sir Leon BRITTAN
Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities
Christos PAPOUTSIS Member of the Commission of the European
Communities
For the United States of America
For Amerikas Forenede Stater
Voor de Verenigde Staten van Amerika
Amerikan yhdysvaltojen puolesta
Pour les Étas-Unis d'Amłrique
FŽr die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika
Ćłń ĮłĖ ĒżųüążõĖ Š˙ūłĮõčõĖ Į÷Ė ĮüõęłśČĖ
Per gli Stati Uniti d'America
Pelos Estados Unidos da Amłrica
Por los Estados Unidos de Amłrica
Põ FŠrenta staternas vōgnar
>REFERENCE TO A FILM>
Ambassador Stuart E. EIZENSTAT(1*)and at Brussels this . . . day of
. . . 1995 , in duplicate, in the Danish, Dutch, Finnish, French,
German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish languages,
all eleven languages being equally authentic.
og i Bruxelles, den . . . 1995 (2*), i to eksemplarer, põ dansk,
tysk, spansk, fransk, grösk, italiensk, nederlandsk, portugisisk,
svensk og finsk idet alle elleve sprog er lige autentiske.
en te Brussel op . . . 1995 (3*), in tweevoud, in de Deense, de
Duitse, de Finse, de Franse, de Griekse, de Italiaanse, de
Nederlandse, de Portugese, de Spaanse en de Zweedse taal, zijnde
alle elf teksten gelijkelijk authentiek.
ja Brysselissō . . . pōivōnō . . .kuuta 1995 (4*), kahtena
samanlaisena kappaleena tanskan, hollannin, suomen, ranskan, saksan,
kreikan, italian, portugalin, espanjan ja ruotsin kielellō kaikkien
yhdentoista kielen ollessa todistusvoimaisia,
et š Bruxelles, le . . . 1995 (5*), en deux exemplaires, en langues
allemande, danoise, espagnole, finnoise, fran÷aise, grecque,
italienne, nłerlandaise, portugaise et sułdoise, ces onze langues
faisant toutes łgalement foi,
und zu BrŽssel am . . . 1995 (6*) in zwei Urschriften in dōnischer,
deutscher, finnischer, franzŠsischer, griechischer, italienischer,
niederlōndischer, portugiesischer, spanischer und schwedischer
Sprache, wobei jeder Wortlaut gleichermačen verbindlich ist.
śńł ėĮłĖ ĀęįžąūūõĖ, ėĮłĖ . . . 1995 (7*), õłĖ ōłĘū˙žż, ėĮń ōńżłśĄ,
˙ūūńżōłśĄ, ŠłżūńżōłśĄ, óńūūłśĄ, óõęüńżłśĄ, õūū÷żłśĄ, łĮńūłśĄ,
Ę˙ęĮ˙óńūłśĄ, łėĘńżłśĄ śńł ė˙į÷ōłśĄ, śńł ˙ł ążōõśń óūžėėõĖ õčżńł
õžčė˙į ńįųõżĮłśąĖ.
e a Bruxelles, addü . . . 1995 (8*), in duplice copia, nelle lingue
danese, olandese, finnico, francese, tedesco, greco, italiano,
portoghese, spagnolo, svedese, gli undici testi facenti ugualmente
fede.
e em Bruxelas, em . . . de . . . de 1995 (9*), em duplo exemplar, em
lżnguas alemó, dinamarquesa, espanhola, finlandesa, francesa, grega,
italiana, neerlandesa, portuguesa e sueca, fazendo fł todas as onze
versįes lingużsticas.
y en Bruselas, el . . . de . . . de 1995 (10*), en doble ejemplar en
lenguas alemana, danesa, espaęola, finesa, francesa, griega,
italiana, neerlandesa, portuguesa y sueca, siendo los once textos
igualmente autłnticos.
och i Bryssel den . . . 1995 (11*) i tvõ likalydande exemplar põ
danska, finska, franska, grekiska, italienska, nederlōndska,
portugisiska, spanska, svenska och tyska sprõken vilka alla ōr lika
giltiga.
For the European Atomic Energy Community
For det Europöiske Atomenergiföllesskab
Voor de Europese Gemeenschap voor Atoomenergie
Euroopan atomienergiayhteisŠn puolesta
Pour la Communautł europłenne de l'łnergie atomique
FŽr die Europōische Atomgemeinschaft
Ćłń Į÷ż ÅįęųĘńŪśČ Ź˙łżŽĮ÷Įń ĮĮ˙üłśČĖ ÅżąęóõłńĖ
Per la Comunitš europea dell'energia atomica
Pela Comunidade Europeia da Energia Atėmica
Por la Comunidad Europea de la Energża Atėmica
Põ Europeiska Atomenergiegemenskapens vōgnar
Sir Leon BRITTAN
Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities
Christos PAPOUTSIS
Member of the Commission of the European Communities
For the United States of America
For Amerikas Forenede Stater
Voor de Verenigde Staten van Amerika
Amerikan yhdysvaltojen puolesta
Pour les États-Unis d'Amłrique
FŽr die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika
Ćłń ĮłĖ ĒżųüążõĖ Š˙ūłĮõčõĖ Į÷Ė ĮüõęłśČĖ
Per gli Stati Uniti d'America
Pelos Estados Unidos da Amłrica
Por los Estados Unidos de Amłrica
Põ FŠrenta staternas vōgnar
Ambassador Stuart E. EIZENSTAT
Head of the Mission of the United States of America to the European
Communities
(1*) 29. 3. 1996.
ANNEX A
(Article 8) EURATOM DELINEATED PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAMME
>TABLE POSITION>
>TABLE POSITION>
UNITED STATES DELINEATED PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAMME I. Facilites for
reprocessing or alteration in form or content of plutonium,
uranium-233 and high enriched uranium in an aggregate quantity
exceeding one (1) effective kilogram.
A. REPROCESSING FACILITIES
None
B. FACILITES FOR ALTERATION IN FORM OR CONTENT
>TABLE POSITION>
>TABLE POSITION>
II. Facilities for reprocessing or alteration in form or content of
plutonium, uranium-233 and high enriched uranium in an aggregate
quantity not to exceed one one (1) effective kilogram do not require
specification.
ANNEX B
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Pursuant to Article 17 of this Agreement, rights to intellectual
property created or furnished under this Agreement shall be
allocated as provided in this Annex.
I. Application
This Annex is applicable to all cooperative activities undertaken
pursuant to this Agreement, except as otherwise specifically agreed.
II. Ownership, Allocation and Exercise of Rights
1. For purposes of this Agreement 'Intellectual property` shall have
the meaning found in Article 2 of the Convention establishing the
World Intellectual Property Organization, done at Stockholm, 14 July
2. This Annex addresses the allocation of rights, interests and
royalties between the Parties and participants. Each Party shall
ensure that the other Party may obtain the rights to intellectual
property allocated to it in accordance with this Annex. This Annex
does not otherwise alter or prejudice the allocation between a Party
and its nationals, which shall be determined by that Party's laws
and practices.
4. (a) In the case of cooperative activities between the Parties,
intellectual property arising from joint research, i. e.,
cooperative research supported by both Parties, shall be treated in
a Technology Management Plan according to the following principles:
(i) The Parties shall notify each other within a reasonable time of
any intellectual property rights arising under this Agreement (or
relevant implementing arrangements).
(ii) Unless otherwise agreed, rights and interests in intellectual
property created during joint research shall be exploitable by
either Party without territorial restriction.
(iii) Each Party shall seek protection for the intellectual property
to which it obtains rights and interests under the Technology
Management Plan in a timely fashion.
(iv) Each Party shall have a non-exclusive, irrevocable,
royalty-free licence to use any intellectual property arising under
the Agreement for research and development purposes only.
(v) Visiting researchers shall receive intellectual property rights
and royalty shares earned by the host institutions from licensing of
such intellectual property rights under the policies of the host
institutions.
(b) In all other cases, to the extent required by its laws and
regulations, each Party shall require all its participants to enter
into specific agreements concerning the implementation of joint
research and the respective rights and obligations of the
participants. With respect to intellectual property, the agreement
will normally address, among other things, ownership, protection,
user rights for research and development purposes, exploitation and
dissemination, including arrangements for joint publication, the
rights and obligations of visiting researchers and dispute
settlement procedures. The agreement may also address foreground and
background information, licensing and deliverables.
5. While maintaining the conditions of competition in areas affected
by the Agreement, each Party shall endeavour to ensure that rights
acquired pursuant to this Agreement and arrangements made under it
are exercised in such a way as to encourage, in particular (i) the
use of information created, or otherwise made available, under the
Agreement and its dissemination in so far as this is in accordance
both with the conditions set out in this Agreement, the provisions
of section IV hereof and any rules which may be in force under the
Parties' domestic laws governing treatment of sensitive or
confidential information in the nuclear field, and (ii) the adoption
and implementation of international standards.
III. Copyright works
Consistent with the terms of this Agreement, copyright belonging to
the Parties or to participants shall be accorded treatment
consistent with the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights administered by the World Trade
Organization.
IV. Scientific Literary Works
Subject to the treatment provided for undisclosed information in
section V, the following procedures shall apply:
1. Each Party shall be entitled to a non-exclusive, irrevocable,
royalty-free licence in all countries to translate, reproduce and
publicly distribute information contained in scientific and
technical journals, articles, reports, books, or other media,
directly arising from joint research pursuant to this Agreement by
or on behalf of the Parties.
2. All publicly distributed copies of a copyrighted work prepared
under this provision shall indicate the names of the authors of the
work unless an author explicitly declines to be names. They shall
also bear a clearly visible acknowledgment of the cooperative
support of the Parties.
V. Undisclosed Information
A. Documentary undisclosed information
1. Each Party and the participants shall identify at the earliest
possible moment the information that they wish to remain undisclosed
in relation to this Agreement, taking account, inter alia, of the
following criteria:
- the information is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body
or in the precise configuration or assembly of its components,
generally known or readily accessible by lawful means;
- the information has actual or potential commercial value by virtue
of its secrecy;
- the information has been subject to steps that were reasonable
under the circumstances by the person lawfully in control, to
maintain its secrecy.
The Parties or the participants may in certain cases agree that,
unless otherwise indicated, parts or all of the information
provided, exchanged or created in the course of joint research
pursuant to this Agreement may not be disclosed.
2. Each Party or participant shall ensure that undisclosed
information under the Agreement and its ensuant privileged nature is
readily recognizable as such by the other Party or participant, for
example by means of an appropriate marking or restrictive legend.
This also applies to any reproduction of the said information, in
whole or in part.
A Party or participant receiving undisclosed information pursuant to
such agreement shall respect the privileged nature thereof. These
limitations shall automatically terminate when this information is
disclosed by the owner without restriction.
3. Undisclosed information communicated under this Agreement may be
disseminated by the receiving Party or participant to persons
employed by the receiving Party or participant including its
contractors, and other concerned departments of the Party or
participant authorized for the specific purposes of the joint
research under way, provided that any undisclosed information so
disseminated shall be protected to the extent provided by each
Party's laws and regulations and shall be readily recognizable as
such, as set out above.
B. Non-documentary undisclosed information
Non-documentary undisclosed or other confidential or privileged
information provided in seminars and other meetings arranged under
the Agreement, or information arising from the attachment of staff,
use of facilities, or joint projects, will be treated by the Parties
or their designees according to the principles specified for
documentary information in the Agreement, provided, however, that
the recipient of such undisclosed or other confidential or
privileged information has been made aware in writing of the
confidential character of the information communicated not later
than the time such a communication is made.
C. Control
Each Party shall endeavour to ensure that undisclosed information
received by it under this Agreement shall be controlled as provided
herein. If one of the Parties becomes aware that it will be, or may
be reasonably expected to become, unable to meet the
non-dissemination provisions of paragraphs A and B above, it shall
immediately inform the other Party. The Parties shall thereafter
consult to define an appropriate course of action.
VI. Dispute Settlement and New Types and Unforeseen Intellectual
Property
1. Disputes between the Parties concerning intellectual property
shall be resolved in accordance with Article 12 of this Agreement.
2. In the event either Party or a participant concludes that a new
type of intellectual property not covered in a TMP or agreement
between participants may result from a cooperative activity
undertaken pursuant to this Agreement, or if other unforeseen
difficulties arise, the Parties shall enter into immediate
discussions with the object of assuring that the protection,
exploitation and dissemination of the intellectual property in
question are adequately provided for in their respective
territories.
Declaration on non-proliferation policy
1. On the occasion of the signature of the new Agreement for
cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the
European Atomic Energy Community and the United States of America,
the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the United
States, and the European Union have decided to record the following
understandings.
2. The United States and the European Union reaffirm their support
for appropriately strengthening nuclear non-proliferation measures
on a worldwide basis, their commitment increasingly to open peaceful
nuclear trade and technology for States that abide by accepted
international non-proliferation rules and their opposition to
controls that unfairly burden legitimate commerce and unduly
restrain worldwide growth and opportunity in the peaceful nuclear
area.
3. The United States and the European Union are committed to
ensuring that research on, and development and use of, nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes are carried out in a manner consistent
with the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (the Treaty), to which the United States and all
Member States of the Community are parties. They affirm their
intention to work closely together and with other interested States
to urge universal adherence to the Treaty. They share the view that
the Treaty is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation
regime, and that an effective non-proliferation regime is necessary
to achieve a full realization of the peaceful benefits of nuclear
energy and the objectives of Article IV of the Treaty. They further
share the view that assurance of non-proliferation has an important
bearing on assurance of supply and that recognition or this
relationship has proved important in many deliberations on measures
to facilitate international nuclear trade and cooperation.
4. Neither expects any policy changes or other circumstances to take
place that would adversely affect the terms for cooperation
established by the Agreement including, in particular, those terms
relating to agreement for certain activities to be carried out on an
assured, secure and uninterrupted basis over the life of the
Agreement.
5. The United States furthermore confirms its readiness to engage in
negotiations with the European Atomic Energy Community concerning
elimination of provisions regarding consent in so far as
improvements in the global non-proliferation environment lead to
changes in the U. S. position in this respect.
6. The United States and the European Union fully support the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its indispensable role
in non-proliferation. They recognize the IAEA's safeguards system as
an essential element of the international non-proliferation regime.
They have confidence in the IAEA safeguards system, while
recognizing the need for the continuation of work on improvement of
that system, especially in areas of proliferation concern. They
share the view that the non-nuclear weapon States having nuclear
facilities that are not under IAEA safeguards should put such
facilities under IAEA safeguards, and that adherence to the Treaty
is the best way to achieve this result.
7. The United States and the European Union are prepared to continue
to take such steps as are necessary to allow the IAEA to apply
safeguards effectively and efficiently and to attain its inspection
goals at nuclear facilities in their respective jurisdictions in
accordance, respectively with the safeguards agreement between the
Agency and the United States of America and the safeguards
agreements between the Agency, the Community and the Member States
of the Community.
8. The United States further recognizes that pursuant to the Euratom
Treaty, the Community has to make certain, by appropriate
supervision, that nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes
other than those for which they are intended, and that to this end
safeguards are applied in accordance with Chapter VII of the Euratom
Treaty. The United States and the European Union share the view that
the Community's regional safeguards system makes an important and
valuable contribution to the achievement of non-proliferation goals
and the abovementioned objectives.
9. The United States, the Community, and all its Member States
recall that they are parties to the International Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the provisions of which are
important to the prevention of the illicit circulation of nuclear
material. The United States and the Member States of the Community
affirm their intention to ensure application of adequate physical
protection to the use, storage and transport of nuclear material
within their respective jurisdictions.
10. The United States and the European Union reaffirm their shared
view that the common nuclear non-proliferation export policies and
practices reflected in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines
and the ZANGGER Committee understandings play an important role in
ensuring that peaceful nuclear cooperation is carried out under
appropriate conditions and controls. The United States and the
European Union stress in particular the importance of the NSG policy
of requiring IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities, present and
future, as a condition for transfer to any non-nuclear weapon State
of any nuclear facilities, equipment, components or materials on the
NSG and ZANGGER Committee trigger list, and of the NSG arrangement
for the control of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material and
related technology.
They also reaffirm their intention to exercise caution and restraint
in the export of sensitive items such as reprocessing and enrichment
equipment and technology, recovered plutonium, and highly enriched
uranium.
11. The United States and the European Union affirm their intention
to cooperate with each other and with other interested States to
urge all nuclear suppliers to adhere to the NSG guidelines for
nuclear transfers and otherwise to conduct nuclear export policies
in a manner that contributes to the prevention of nuclear
proliferation.
12. The United States and the European Union acknowledge that the
separation, storage, transportation, and use of plutonium call for
the continuation of measures to ensure the avoidance of risk of
nuclear proliferation. They are determined to continue to support
the strengthening of international safeguards and other
non-proliferation measures.
29 March 1996
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 7 November 1995
H.E. Mr Warren Cristopher,
Secretary of State of the United States of America.
Sir,
We have the honour to refer to Article 4.2 of the Agreement for
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy between the
European Atomic Energy Community and the United States of America.
With regard to the implementation of that Article it is our
understanding that we have agreed on the following. Authorizations,
including export and import licences as well as authorizations or
consents to third parties relating to trade, industrial operations
or nuclear material movements on the territories of the Parties
should generally be issued within a period of two months of a
submission to the relevant authority. Nuclear trade between the
European Community and the US should be facilitated and encouraged;
it is recognized that reliability of supply is essential and that
industry in the Community and in the USA needs continuing
reassurance that deliveries can be made on time in order to plan for
the efficient operation of nuclear installations; it is further
recognized that undue delays in the grant of export licences and
other relevant authorizations including import licences would be
inconsistent with the sound and efficient administration of this
Agreement.
We wish to recall that, in accordance with Article 10 of the
Agreement, the Parties will not interfere in the nuclear programmes
of each other; they recognize that the European Union, it Member
States and the USA are equally strongly committed to international
nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards regimes.
In the negotiation of the Agreement the Parties took due note of the
undertakings which had been entered into in this field.
The Parties express their full confidence in each other's compliance
with such undertakings. Accordingly the Parties, in the grant of
licences for the export of items pursuant to this Agreement, will
refrain from requiring additional confirmation from the other Party
and its relevant persons, undertakings or authorities about full
compliance with these commitments.
In this context, it is further agreed that if the relevant authority
considers that an application cannot be processed within the target
two months period, it shall immediately provide a reasoned
information to the submitting persons or undertakings. In the event
of a refusal to authorize an application or of a delay exceeding
four months from the date of the first application, the Party of the
submitting persons or undertakings may call for urgent consultations
under Article 12 of the Agreement which shall take place at the
earliest opportunity, and in any case not later than 30 days after
such request.
We would appreciate your confirmation that you share the
understandings recorded in this letter.
Please accept, Sir, the assurance of our highest consideration.
For the European Atomic Energy Community:
Sir Leon BRITTAN
Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities
Christos PAPOUTSIS
Member of the Commission of the European Communities
Brussels, November 7 1995
No 42
The Honorable Sir Leon Brittan,
Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities.
The Honorable Christos Papoutsis,
Member of the Commission of the European Communities.
Sirs:
I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter, dated today,
concerning the issue of Export Licenses, a copy of which is
attached.
I have the further honor to inform you that the Government of the
United States of America shares the understandings recorded in that
letter.
Accept, Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Stuart E. EIZENSTAT
Ambassador
No 43
The United States Mission to the European Union has the honor to
present its compliments to the Commission of the European
Communities and wishes to inform the Commission that the United
States of America is firmly committed to eliminating over time the
use of high enriched uranium from civil nuclear energy uses. Toward
that end it has promoted the Reduced Enrichment for Research and
Test Reactors (RERTR) program to develop low enriched fuels for such
reactors and has proposed to adopt a policy of managing spent
nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors including the
possibility of accepting U.S. origin spent research reactor fuel in
the United States for disposal. In the latter case, the United
States is preparing a programmatic environmental impact statement
which will be completed in 1995.
The United States of America recognizes, however, that specific
research reactors in the European Atomic Energy Community may, under
certain circumstances, need to use high enriched uranium as fuel.
If, in order to meet such needs, the Community should seek to
re-enrich high enriched uranium supplied under the previous
agreements for cooperation, the United States of America confirms
that it will use its best endeavors to come to agreement with the
Community in accordance with the provisions of Article 8.1(A) on the
conditions to be applied to such enrichment.
The United States Mission to the European Union wishes to renew to
the Commission of the European Communities the assurances of its
highest consideration.
Stuart E. EIZENSTAT
Ambassador
United States Mission to the European Union
Brussels, November 7 1995.
Brussels, November 7 1995
No 44
The Honorable Sir Leon Brittan,
Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities
The Honorable Christos Papoutsis,
Member of the Commission of the European Communities
Sirs:
I have the honor to refer to the Agreement for Cooperation in the
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy between the United States of America
and the European Atomic Energy Community (hereinafter referred to as
'the U.S.-Euratom Agreement`) and in particular to Article 8.1C(iii)
of that Agreement.
I have the further honor to confirm that the United States is
negotiating a new peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with the
Swiss Federation, and that the United States is prepared to offer
long-term prior consent to the Swiss Federation for the transfer of
irradiated nuclear material subject to such an agreement into
Euratom for reprocessing and for storage of the recovered plutonium
and its fabrication into mixed oxide fuel elements. The United
States is also prepared, in connection with a new peaceful nuclear
cooperation agreement with the Swiss Federation, to offer long-term,
prior consent to Euratom to the retransfer of Swiss plutonium,
including such plutonium contained in MOX fuel elements, subject to
the U.S.-Euratom Agreement, to Switzerland for use in that country's
peaceful nuclear program.
Accept, Sirs, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
Stuart E. EIZENSTAT
Ambassador
No 45
The United States Mission to the European Union presents its
compliments to the Commission of the European Communities and refers
the Commission to the Agreement for cooperation in the Peaceful Uses
of Nuclear Energy between the United States of America and the
European Atomic Energy Community, signed on 7 November 1995, and in
particular to Article 21, paragraph 6, thereof.
According to the terms of that provision, plutonium is included in
the definition of 'special fissionable material`.
In Article XX of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), the definition of special fissionable material
includes a reference to plutonium 239 and not to plutonium.
It is internationally recognized, e. g., in paragraph 36 of IAEA
document INFCIRC 153, that plutonium with an isotopic composition of
Pu238 exceeding 80 % is of no relevance for safeguards purposes and
may be exempt from the usual controls applied to special fissionable
material.
The Parties agree that the adoption of the definition of special
fissionable material in paragraph 6 of Article 21 is not intended to
supersede the IAEA definition or to interfere with the multilateral
safeguards regime.
Accordingly, the Parties confirm that plutonium with an isotopic
composition of Pu238 exceeding 80 % need not be brought within the
scope of the Agreement.
The Mission would appreciate confirmation by the Commission that it
shares the understandings recorded in this letter.
The United States Mission to the European Union wishes to renew to
the Commission of the European Communities the assurances of its
highest consideration.
Stuart E. EIZENSTAT
Ambassador
United States Mission to the European Union,
Brussels, November 7 1995
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 7 November 1995
The Commission of the European Communities presents its compliments
to the Mission of the United States of America to the European
Communities and has the honour to acknowledge receipt of the letter,
dated 7 November 1995, from the Mission of the United States of
America to the European Communities concerning Article 21.6, a copy
of which is attached.
The Commission of the European Communities wishes to inform the
Mission of the United States to the European Communities that it
shares the understandings recorded in that letter.
The Commission of the European Communities avails itself of this
opportunity to renew to the Mission of the United States of America
to the European Communities the assurance of its highest
consideration.
For the European Atomic Energy Community:
The Honorable Sir Leon BRITTAN
Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities
The Honorable Christos PAPOUTSIS
Member of the Commission of the European Communities
No 46
The United States Mission to the European Union presents its
compliments to the Commission of the European Communities and refers
the Commission to the Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses
of Nuclear Energy between the United States of America and the
European Atomic Energy Community, signed 7 November 1995.
Sensitive Nuclear Technology
The Government of the United States of America notes that the
Agreement does not provide for the transfer of sensitive nuclear
technology or any component or group of components which are
essential to the operation of a complete uranium enrichment, nuclear
fuel processing or heavy water production facility. The Government
of the United States of America confirms to the European Atomic
Energy Community that sensitive nuclear technology, defined as any
information (including information incorporated in a production or
utilization facility or important component part thereof) which is
not available to the public and which is important to the design,
construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of a uranium
enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for
the production of heavy water, but not including Restricted Data
(1), may be transferred to the Community outside an agreement for
cooperation pursuant to sections 127 and 128 of the U.S. Atomic
Energy Act. The transfer of a reprocessing, enrichment or heavy
water facility or a major critical component thereof may take place
only pursuant to an agreement for cooperation.
Reactor Technology
The Government of the United States of America further confirms that
nuclear power reactor technology may be transferred to the Community
outside an agreement for cooperation.
Non-nuclear material other than the one defined in Article 21.5 of
the Agreement, e. g., zirconium and its alloys and compounds, may be
transferred from the United States of America to persons and
undertakings in the Community outside an agreement for cooperation.
The Government of the United States of America notes that sensitive
technology and Reactor Technology may be transferred from the
European Community to the United States outside an agreement for
cooperation between them.
The United States Mission to the European Union wishes to renew to
the Commission of the European Communities the assurances of its
highest consideration.
Stuart E. EIZENSTAT
Ambassador
United States Mission to the European Union,
Brussels, November 7 1995
>REFERENCE TO A FILM>
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 7 November 1995
The Commission of the European Communities presents its compliments
to the Mission of the United States of America to the European
Communities and has the honour to acknowledge receipt of the letter,
dated 7 November 1995, from the Mission of the United States of
America to the European Communities concerning sensitive nuclear
technology and reactor technology, a copy of which is attached.
The Commission of the European Communities wishes to inform the
Mission of the United States of America to the European Communities
that it has taken due note of the contents of this letter.
The Commission of the European Communities avails itself of this
opportunity to renew to the Mission of the United States of America
to the European Communities the assurance of its highest
consideration.
For the European Atomic Energy Community:
The Honorable Sir Leon BRITTAN
Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities
The Honorable Christos PAPOUTSIS
Member of the Commission of the European Communities
Brussels, November 7 1995
No 47
The Honorable Sir Leon Brittan,
Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities
The Honorable Christos Papoutsis,
Member of the Commission of the European Communities.
Sirs:
I have the honor to refer to the Agreement for Cooperation in the
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy between the United States of America
and the European Atomic Energy Community, signed today (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Agreement`), and in particular to paragraph 2 of
Article 7 of the Agreement, which provides that 'non-nuclear
material, nuclear material and equipment transferred pursuant to
this Agreement, and special fissionable material used in or produced
through the use of such items shall not be used ... for any military
purpose`.
In consequence of this provision, any U.S. nuclear cooperation with
the Community or a Member State for military purposes would
necessarily take place outside the scope of the Agreement and would
require a separate agreement for cooperation specifically intended
to further such military purposes. I can confirm on behalf of the
Government of the United States of America that such nuclear
cooperation with a Member State for military purposes will be
suitably considered when circumstances so warrant.
Accept, Sirs, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
Stuart E. EIZENSTAT
Ambassador
(1) 'Restricted Data` means any data concerning (1) design,
manufacture, or utilization of nuclear weapons, (2) the production
of special fissionable material or (3) the use of special
fissionable material in the production of energy, but does not
include data of a Party which it has declassified or removed from
the category of restricted data.